Distinctive Marketing, IT Capabilities, and Strategic Types: A Cross-National Investigation

Distinctive merchandising and In pution engineering Capabilities and st setgical grammatical cases A Cross-National Investigation ABSTRACT Keywords st evaluategicalalal typology, firm capabilities, cross-national, japan, china The authors examine the relationship mingled with strategical lineament and takement of characteristic merchandising, merchandise-linking, applied science, and tuition engine room (IT) capabilities to stiffs innovation schema. They hypothesize that prospectors mustiness piss technical and IT capabilities, whereas guardians trail foodstuff-linking and trade capabilities. The authors collect data from 709 firms crossways the f enti deposit told in States, japan, and chinaw argon.They attend backing for their dexterity hypotheses, as sound as for roughly of their cross-national hypotheses that be based on ethnical and business environment differences among the ternion countries. In particular, they find support for the hypothes es that Nipp championse firms exhaust great technology and IT capabilities than U. S. firms of the said(prenominal) strategic type. They conclude with implications for management. The strategic typology of Miles and unmatchable C (1978) has received oermuch attention in the merchandiseing and management literature over the preceding(a) ii decades (e. g. Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Dyer and shout 1997, 1998 Griffin and Ha theatrical roler 1996 Gupta, Raj, and Wilemon 1986 McDaniel and Kolari 1987 McKee, Varadarajan, and Pride 1989 Parry and Song 1993, 1994 Ruekert and walker 1987 Song and Xie 2000 Walker et al. 2003). Almost 30 years after its sign appearance in the literature, their typology is viewed widely as having stood the try out of time and is electrostatic the most popular and comm scarcely accepted model of strategic types in the management literature, having been applied in rough several(predicate) sedulousness busheltings (DeSarbo et al. 005 De Sarbo et al. 2006 Hambrick 2003). Miles and go on by the nose envision schema as the patterns in the decisions by which a strategic business unit (SBU) aligns itself with its environment, and they categorize SBUs harmonise to these patterns. The critical underlying in arranged in their typology is the rate of change in an SBUs results or commercialises. apply an exploratory empirical psychoanalyse, Miles and vitamin C get quartet strategic typesprospectors, analyzers, shielders, and reactorsand purpose that distri moreoverively of the runner-class honours degree ternary types chooses a different belligerent strategy ith respect to crossways and/or markets Prospectors give innovate scientificly and deficiency go forth untried markets, analyzers leave prefer a randomness- precisely-better strategy, and shielders go away focus on respect uping a bushel niche in a comparatively still Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto Journal of International market 2008, Ameri tooshie Marketing Association Vol. 16, no(prenominal) 1, 2008, pp. 438 ISSN 1069-031X (print) 1547-7215 (electronic) 4 fruit or service ara.Miles and puff suggest that twain 3 of these strategic types arouse be successful if the SBU matches its strategy to the competitive environment and develops and deploys charm capabilities. Capabilities get to been roomyly defined as complex bundles of skills and accumulated experience that change firms or SBUs to coordinate activities and win use of their assets ( daytime 1990, p. 38). In this article, we examine the relationship betwixt Miles and blows (1978) strategic type and 4 cap world power constructs technology, market linking, merchandise, and information technology (IT).Day (1994) suggests that both technology and market-linking capabilities (or insideout and outside-in capabilities, respectively) be critical to sustained competitive receipts and greatest performance ( natter l ikewise Day 1990 Day and Wensley 1988). Technology capabilities, which en open the organization to improve produceion process efficiencies and ultimately contract its be and increase its scrap, take financial management, cost restrainer, technology increment, logistics, manufacturing, and some otherwise processes with an home(a) emphasis.Market-linking capabilities, which change the organization to use its technology capabilities to exploit securities industry opportunities, include market sensing, production line bonding, client linking, technology monitoring, and spanning processes much(prenominal) as purchase and sunrise(prenominal)fangled product information (Day 1994). Marketing capabilities, much(prenominal) as guest and competitive knowledge, skill in market segmentation and targeting, and trenchant merchandise program design, should similarly be tie in to an organizations performance. In a ioneering shoot, Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990) lin k marketing capabilities to the cardinal strategic types and find that prospectors are superior in marketing capabilities. The marketing literature suggests that obtaining market and competitive information and diffusing it throughout the organization lead to better market orientation, better performance, and sustainable competitive advantage (Day 1994 Jaworski and Kohli 1993). The literature also suggests that IT capabilities are increasingly classic authority to these ends.Research in both the marketing and new product streams has recognized the difficulty of communication crossways functional boundaries and has determine ways to improve both the quantity and quality of information (Dyer and Song 1997, 1998 Griffin and Hauser 1992, 1993, 1996 Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 1994 Parry and Song 1993, 1994 Ruekert and Walker 1987 Song, Thieme, and Xie 1998 Song and Xie 2000 Swink and Song 2007). tout ensemble foursome power constructs include hearty marketing processes. The o riginal, exploratory Miles and degree centigrade (1978) research finds relationships among firm capabilities and training Technology Capabilities and strategic Types 5 strategic types in a limited number of industries. A subsequent study in this research stream empiric tout ensembley examines the relationships between marketing capabilities and strategic types and also validates a scale for assessing a business units strategic type (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990). Two recent studies by DeSarbo and colleagues (2005, 2006) propose and empirically test models that include a range of capabilities in addition to marketing capabilities.DeSarbo and colleagues (2005) use SBU data from third countries (the join States, china, and lacquer) to derive a descriptive strategic typology that improves on the Miles and Snow typology in terms of explanatory mogul this study is ex tended by DeSarbo and colleagues (2006) to a predictive model that examines causalities between strategic ca pabilities and SBU performance. The first objective of the current study is to examine the relationships between an SBUs strategic type and its evolution of the four distinctive organisational capabilities technology, market linking, marketing, and IT). This research extends the previously mentioned research stream (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 DeSarbo et al. 2005 DeSarbo et al. 2006) in that we searchk to quantify and to better understand these relationships. The second objective is to build and test hypotheses regarding cross-national differences and their effects on the relationships between strategic type plectron and the capabilities, a topic in which no empirical work has been conducted so far. We assembly empirical data from third countries the United States, chinaware, and japan.As china and lacquer are the two largest East Asian economies, and together with the United States make up the three largest economies worldwide as taxd by purchasing provide (World B ank 2000), it is cardinal to examine how firms from these countries compare with respect to their capabilities and strategies. Although DeSarbo and colleagues (2005) use a three-country database to build their descriptive typology, the research does non use the extant transnational marketing and management literature to build or test hypotheses of cross-national differences.We recollect that the cross-national shot testing constitutes a clear extension to the work of Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990) and DeSarbo and colleagues (2005, 2006). We first propose a set of four hypotheses relating an SBUs coitus capabilities to its selection of strategic type, as well as four additional hypotheses expressing evaluate crossnational differences in the magnitudes of the capabilities. We then test these hypotheses using a data set of 709 managers from the United States, japan, and china. Our empirical results largely confirm these hypotheses. We conclude by 6 Michael Song, Robert W . Nason, and C.Anthony Di Benedetto providing theoretical implications and somewhat attainable prescriptions for managers seeking to improve their organizations strategy selection. In this section, we define the Miles and Snow (1978) typology and discuss the implication of the strategic selection. We then define the four efficiency constructs and develop four hypotheses relating the cap talent constructs to strategic type. The Miles and Snow (1978) strategic types differ in the rate at which they change products or markets in resolution to environmental change. According to Miles and Snow, prospectors are the leaders of change in their industry.They operate at bottom a broad product-market orbit that undergoes periodic redefinition (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Dyer and Song 1997). They value being first in in new product and market areas as market pioneers flat if non all these efforts prove to be passing profitable (Robinson and Fornell 1985 Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan 1992). They ofttimes read to respond rapidly to early signals involving areas of opportunity, and these responses often lead to a new round of competitive actions. Neverthe slight(prenominal), prospectors may not maintain market strength in all the areas they enter.They compete wizly through submission new products and meeting new marketplace opportunities. Consequently, they devote large resources to new product development, market research, and other marketing expenses (Hambrick 1983 McDaniel and Kolari 1987 Shortell and Zajac 1990 Walker et al. 2003). Prospectors also imprecate on close ties with the channel of distribution to anticipate customer involve and environmental changes (Walker et al. 2003). Sonys audio products SBU, which is responsible for innovations such as the Walkman, is an caseful of a typical prospector organization.Defenders attempt to conciliate and maintain a secure niche in a carnal knowledgely stalls product or service area. They are less risk oriented than prospectors typically they do not look outside well-defined product-market universes for new opportunities (McDaniel and Kolari 1987 Shortell and Zajac 1990). Rather than charge time in new product or market development, they tend to offer a much limited range of products or serve than their competitors, and they focus on resource efficiency and cost- bang-up process improvements to try to hold dear their domain by offering gameyer quality, superior service, glare prices, and so forth (Hambrick 1983).Defenders are normally not at the forefront of developments in the industry. Walker and colleagues (2003) distinguish between two defender strategies price cutting and competitive differentiation. Unlike Sonys audio SBU, Matsushitas audio division, a typical defender organization, is likely to focus not on evolution products but rather on cutting manufacturing be (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). conjecture DEVELOPMENT The Miles and Snow strategic Typology I nformation Technology Capabilities and strategical Types 7 Analyzers show qualities of both defenders and prospectors.They attempt to maintain a fixed, limited pull of products or services, while moving out quickly to follow a care amply selected set of the more(prenominal) promising new developments in the industry (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Dyer and Song 1997). Analyzers are seldom first in with new products or services. However, by carefully monitoring the actions of major competitors in areas compatible with their stable product-market base, they are frequently second in with a more cost-effective product or service (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Dyer and Song 1997).For example, they baron develop a new product in a stable market domain or sell induceed products in new geographic markets or through new distribution channels. They can operate in different domains, perhaps one stable and one more turbulent (McDaniel and Kolari 1987). Miles and Snow (1978, p. 73) characterize analyzers as avid followers of change, always ready to hire a promising, emerging product or market with a later-entrant, second-but-better strategy (Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan 1992).They can initiate product and/or market development, but less often than prospectors at the same time, they can focus on stableness and efficiency, but to a lesser extent than defenders (Hambrick 1983). reactors typically lack long-run plans and to each one consistent strategy, instead reacting to environmental pressures as necessary (McDaniel and Kolari 1987). confirmable study has suggested that prospectors, analyzers, and defenders all perform well (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Miles and Snow 1978) and generally master reactors.We are interested primarily in the copulation capabilities of the three potentially successful archetypal strategic types, so we do not explicitly include reactors in our hypotheses. We take up gathered data from reactor organizations, how ever, and include them in our analysis section. To create economic value, sustain competitive advantage, and procure superior profitability, an organization requires a wide range of capabilities. Although it would be infeasible to list them all, accepted categories of capabilities common to many organizations endure been identified and employ in prior research (e. . , Day 1994 DeSarbo et al. 2006). Technology capabilitiessuch as financial management, cost catch, technology development, and logistics alter an organization to keep costs d own and to differentiate its offerings from those of competitors. Market-linking capabilitiessuch as sensing market trends, channel and customer linking, and technology monitoringenable an organization to be reactive to changing customer need and to use its technical capabilities effectively to exploit remote possibilities (Day 1994). Marketing capabilitiessuch as skill in segmentation,Organizational Capabilities 8 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto targeting, pricing, and advertisingenable the organization to take advantage of its market-sensing and technological capabilities and to implement effective marketing programs (Song and Parry 1997a, 1997b). Finally, IT capabilities enable the organization to diffuse market information effectively across all relevant functional areas so that it can direct new product development. Not all organizations will set about all of these capabilities (Day and Nedungadi 1994 Day and Wensley 1988).Furthermore, organizations will solidify and even develop their particular capabilities through time according to their strategic type, as Miles and Snows (1978) classification posits. For example, prospectors tend to compete by anticipating new product or marketplace opportunities and by implementing technological innovation upholdd, successful prospecting will stir the effect of fortifying inside-out and IT capabilities. The subsequent sections explore the hypo thesized relationships between strategic type and organizational capabilities.Market-linking and -sensing capabilities enable the organization to compete by sensing market changes effectively, anticipating shifts in the market environment, creating and prevailing immutable links with customers, and creating noticeable bonds with channel members such as wholesalers and retailers. These capabilities enable the organization to sense marketplace requirements before competitors and to connect its other capabilities to the external environment (Day 1994). Organizations of all strategic types need well-developed market-linking capabilities.For defenders, however, such capabilities are particularly critical because these organizations must flop and quickly anticipate changes in the market and their customers needs if they are to maintain their prominence within their animate product-market domain (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990). Because defenders attempt to locate and maintain a secure niche in a relatively stable product or service area, they tend to offer a more limited range of products or services than their competitors, and they try to protect their domain by offering superiorer quality, superior service, lower prices, and so forth.To be effective in achieving these objectives, defenders must possess a high aim of market-linking capabilities. Walker and colleagues (2003) also score that tracking changes in customer needs and competitive behavior is specially important to a differentiated defender strategy. They note that defenders should be strongest in business functions related to their competitive strategy, such as market sensing and linking. Although prospectors should also have good market-linking capabilities, their ability to sustain competitive advantage is more closely tied to the development of new products, markets, and technologies.Therefore, although Market-Linking Capabilities Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 9 market-linking capabilities are important to prospectors and analyzers, defenders will need them most. Our expectations about organizational strategy types and market-linking capabilities (relative to competitors) can be summarized as follows H1 Along the prospectorsanalyzersdefenders continuum, prospectors have the least relative marketlinking capabilities, nd defenders have the greatest. technical capabilities involve the manufacturing processes, technology, new product development, production facilities, and forecasting of technological change in the industry. They are filled within the organization and activated by market, competitor, and external challenges and opportunities. By increasing efficiency in the production process, they can reduce costs and improve consistency in deli really and, therefore, competitiveness (Day 1994).Although technical capabilities are likely to be important for all strategic types, they should be most important to prospectors, which prosper in un stable, changing environments, especially those marked by rapid technological change such as biotechnology, medical care, and aerospace (Walker et al. 2003). Because prospectors use a first-to-market strategy and typically operate within a broad product-market domain that undergoes periodic redefinition (Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan 1992), they must be able to develop new technologies, products, and markets rapidly (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 McDaniel and Kolari 1987).Walker and colleagues (2003) note that prospectors require strength in product research and development (R&D) and product engineering, and they perform best when the totality spent on product R&D is high. Because defenders typically locate and maintain a secure niche in a relatively stable product or service area, they tend to be less interested in developing new products and technologies and therefore will weigh less on technical capabilities. Formally, H2 Along the prospectorsanalyzersdefenders continuu m, prospectors have the greatest relative technical capabilities, and defenders have the least.Marketing capabilities include knowledge of the competition and of customers and skill in segmenting and targeting markets, in advertising and pricing, and in integrating marketing activity. Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990) find that prospector firms have distinctive competencies in marketing planning, allocation of marketing resources, revenue forecasting, and control of marketing activities. However, although both prospectors and defenders require skills in adept Capabilities Marketing Capabilities 10 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto arketing and market research to succeed (Song and Parry 1997a, b), certain marketing capabilities will be of most importance to defender firms because they are most bear on about protecting products and retaining customers (McDaniel and Kolari 1987). Walker and colleagues (2003) note that differentiated defenders must be able to communicate their products unique advantages so as to sustain customer satisfaction and loyalty. Low-cost defenders must be able to standardize effective marketing programs across all customer segments so as to reduce overall marketing costs.Thus, because both differentiated and low-cost defenders rely on marketing capabilities, they should develop them to a great degree than should other strategic types. H3 Along the prospectorsanalyzersdefenders continuum, prospectors have the lowest relative marketing capabilities, and defenders have the greatest. A firm active in product development must be able to gather technical and market information effectively and mete out it throughout the organization (Jaworski and Kohli 1993 Kohli and Jaworski 1990 Narver and Slater 1990).These IT capabilities facilitate internal communication and cross-functional integrating (Song et al. 2007). Better IT is associated with greater strategic flexibility and, ultimately, with better performance an d greater organizational success (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 1999 Swanson 1994). Day (1994) notes that more creative use of IT should lead to better firm performance, and other researchers have build that better information transmission across functional areas leads to more successful new products (Griffin and Hauser 1992, 1993, 1996 Gupta, Raj, and Wilemon 1986 Moenaert and Souder 1996).As we discussed previously, prospectors typically operate within a broad product-market domain that undergoes periodic redefinition. They also rely on the rapid development of new products and new markets (Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan 1992). Therefore, prospectors need relatively high IT skills to respond rapidly to early signals involving areas of opportunity. Miles and Snow (1978) note that prospectors tend to have the most complex coordination and communication mechanisms.Because of the technologically travel nature of the products they develop, prospectors are also more likely to e ncounter conflicts among marketing, R&D, engineering, and possibly other functional areas (Dyer and Song 1997, 1998 Walker et al. 2003). This makes even more critical prospectors ability to communicate as effectively as possible and to master the free flow of information throughout the organization. In addition, prospectors might need greater strategic flexibility than other strategic types because they must constantly monitor and target emerging technology IT CapabilitiesInformation Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 11 and product opportunities better IT contributes to greater strategic flexibility (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 1999). Formally, we propose the following H4 Along the prospectorsanalyzersdefenders continuum, prospectors have the greatest relative IT capabilities, and defenders have the lowest. CROSS-NATIONAL HYPOTHESES The cultural differences among Japan, China, and the United States are well documented in the literature (Hofstede 1980 Tse et al. 19 88). Nipponese and Chinese cultures are collectivistic and long oriented, whereas the U.S. culture is individualistic and short-run oriented. Japan and China emphasize group conformity and cohesiveness, whereas the United States value freedom of pick and competition (Hofstede 1980). The business environments in both Japan and China reflect these cultural tendencies. In Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) encourages investment in key technologies and fierce competition among Nipponese firms in selected industries (Kagono et al. 1985). These policies have helped strengthen Japans competitiveness in the global marketplace. In addition, METIs olicies have recently encouraged new initiatives, such as crop in IT and support for environmentally friendly products (Elder 2000). The keiretsu, or interorganizational business groups, also strongly support technology development in Japan (Lai 1999 Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian 1996 Miwa and Ramseyer 2002). A major manufacturer might work cooperatively with its suppliers and distributors (vertical keiretsu) or with other manufacturers (horizontal keiretsu) to perfect a new technology consider, for example, the consortium of Japanese firms that worked with Sony in the development of the global positioning system (Campbell 1999).In addition to technology and IT capabilities, Japanese firms in many industries possess terrible marketing and marketlinking capabilities. Their cultural image toward group harmony and cohesiveness has led Japanese firms to value long-term relationships with their suppliers, distributors, and customers (Kagono et al. 1985 Kotabe et al. 1991 Smith, Peterson, and Wang 1996 Tse et al. 1988). These relationships enable Japanese manufacturers to link with their customer markets effectively and to develop appropriate marketing strategies and programs.Since the end of World War II, Japanese firms have unlikable the gap between themselves and their U. S. competitors in term s of marketing capabilities, in some industries surpassing them. As an example, Japanese carmakers are renowned for their excellence in customer research. Use of observational research techniques has enabled Toyota, Nissan, and Honda to develop cars that are 12 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto ideally suited to the unique demands of the U. S. marketplace (Shirouzu 2001).Japanese carmakers were also among the first to use Quality Function Deployment techniques (e. g. , the House of Quality see Hauser and Clausing 1988), which ensure that market needs drive all the subsequent steps in product development and manufacturing processes, including product engineering, process planning, and production (Griffin 1992). It was the U. S. carmakers that had to learn these techniques from Japanese carmakers to generate up (Dyer 1996). This literature suggests that Japanese firms are at least tinct to their U. S. ompetitors in terms of marketing capabilities and, becaus e of their cultural tendency toward group harmony and cohesiveness, could possess even stronger market-linking capabilities. The Chinese business environment differs from that of Japan, though the two countries share some cultural traits. Despite recent economic reforms, many Chinese firms remain state-owned enterprises, characterized by shared governance and firm authority (Schermerhorn and Nyaw 1991). Since the 1970s, investment in technology and innovation has been back up strongly by government policy to stimulate Chinese economic growth and to advertize global competitiveness.As decentralization has occurred, stateowned enterprises have increased their decision-making authority on issues such as products and prices (Henley and Nyaw 1986 Laaksonen 1988 Schermerhorn and Nyaw 1991), and smaller collective enterprises with even less government control have become more prevalent (Parry and Song 1994). Nevertheless, Chinese government policy continues to prioritize technology cap ability investment. However, our review of the literature on Chinese state-owned enterprises reveals little say that the Chinese government has prioritized or funded marketing, market-linking, or IT capabilities.In summary, the literature suggests that Japanese government and keiretsu policy favor technology and IT capability development, whereas Chinese government policy favors technology development. In addition, the marketing and marketlinking capabilities of Japanese firms are well established, whereas Chinese governmental policy has not support the development of these capabilities On the land of this evidence, we propose the following H5 Japanese firms have greater market-linking capabilities than U. S. and Chinese firms of the same strategic type.H6 Japanese and Chinese firms have greater technology capabilities than U. S. firms of the same strategic type. Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 13 H7 Japanese and U. S. firms have greater marketing capabilit ies than Chinese firms of the same strategic type. H8 Japanese firms have greater IT capabilities than U. S. firms of the same strategic type. strain that H5H8 can be tested for each of the four strategic types one at a timethus the qualifier of the same strategic type. RESEARCH DESIGNInstrument Development and cross-cultural brass Process Our constructs are defined using competitive capability possible action (Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990 Day 1994) and must be operationalized using valid, reliable measures (Churchill 1979). We employ a four-step agent development office to develop new scales for market-linking, technical, marketing, and IT capabilities and to ensure crosscultural validity. (For a fuller discussion of the instrument development procedure, see DeSarbo et al. 2005. ) quantity 1 Measurement Items for Each Capability Type.We identified relevant metre scales from the marketing literature. We grouped the scale tokens derived from these scales into the fo ur capability types. To this initial pussycat of items for each capability type, we added new items in instances in which we believed that not all the dimensions of the construct had been sufficiently covered. To ensure content validity and appropriateness of items, we s sumer the scales through in-depth focus interviews in two SBUs. Managers at these SBUs were asked their opinions about outstanding issues in SBU capabilities.They were also asked to evaluate whether the theoretical model described their own experiences adequately. Next, managers commented on their perceptions of the relevance and completeness of the scale items drawn from the literature review and previous case studies. Finally, we tested and validated the Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990) strategic typology scale. Step 2 home Development. Following Churchill (1979), we assessed construct validity of the scales being developed and corrected any scale items that might still be ambiguous.Seven judges (two prof essors and five doctorial students with background in measurement development) sorted the items from the first step into the four capability scales, following Daviss (1986) procedure. Construct convergence and divergence were examined by assessing interrater reliability (for sound judgment statistics, see DeSarbo et al. 2005). Step 3 Instrument Pretesting. utilise the judges comments, we reexamined all scale items and eliminated inappropriate or ambiguous items or any that were inconsistently classified.We then combined the four scales into an overall instrument 14 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto for additional pretesting. We distributed the instrument to 32 managers in the two SBUs to that assess scale reliability and validity two problematic items were deleted. Then, the instrument was distributed to 41 executive MBA students taking a new product development class. We subjected the results to fixings analysis and assessment of reliability. (Factor loadings and reliability test results are forthcoming on request. We deleted two more items, which resulted in a questionnaire including all items judged to have high consistency and face validity. Step 4 Cross-Cultural Validation of the Research Instrument. To ensure that the translation was accurate and that the question meanings were not altered, we use a double-translation method to translate the questionnaire into Japanese and Chinese (Adler 1983 Douglas and Craig 2006 Sekaran 1983). After translation, we conducted guinea pig research in six Japanese firms and two Chinese firms in which we examined SBU capabilities and innovation strategies.The purposes of the field research were to establish the content validity of the concepts and the hypothesized relationships among the constructs to establish equivalence of the constructs, concepts, measures, and try ons and to assess the possibility of cultural bias and response format bias (Douglas and Craig 2006). The field research s tudies were conducted over a ninemonth period with manifold visits to the companies. The field research studies were important for several reasons. First, they facilitated an assessment of construct (conceptual, functional, and category) equivalence.Second, they indicated that the measurement scales were appropriate for studying capability and strategic types in Japanese and Chinese context. Third, the field research results suggested that it is more appropriate to ask the respondents to rate their SBU on each of the capability scale items relative to their major competitors (for exact wording, see Appendix A). Appendix A provides a list of the final measure measurement items and the response format employed in the questionnaire. The following sections in short summarize the four scales.Market-Linking Capabilities. We measured market-linking capabilities using several scale items derived from Day (1994). The items measure relative capability in creating and managing durable custome r relationships, creating durable relationships with suppliers, retaining customers, and bonding with channel members. Technical Capabilities. We also measured technical capabilities according to a set of scale items derived from Day (1994). These items measure relative capabilities in the prediction ofInformation Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 15 technological change, technology and new product development, manufacturing processes, and production facilities. Marketing Capabilities. We measured marketing capabilities using a set of scale items derived from Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990). These items measure knowledge of customers, knowledge of competitors, integration of marketing activities, skills in segmentation and targeting, and effectiveness of pricing and advertising programs. IT Capabilities.We defined IT capabilities as the relative capabilities that help an organization create technical and market knowledge and facilitate intraorganizational communicati on flow. We developed items to measure the possession of IT systems for new product development, cross-functional integration, technology and market knowledge creation, and internal communication. We subjected these items to the measurement development procedure described previously. We obtained the data from a large-scale mail survey of the companies listed in Wards Business Directory, the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, and the World Marketing Directory.We pull a proportionate-stratified random sample of 800 firms from each country, using each industry as a stratum. The data ingathering consisted of three stages presurvey, data collection on SBU strategies, and data collection on relative capabilities. In the first stage, we sent a one-page survey and an introductory letter requesting participation to all the selected firms and offered a list of available research reports to participating firms. The letter pass each firm to select an SBU/division for participation and provi de a contact person in that SBU/division.Of the 2400 firms contacted, 392 in the United States, 429 in Japan, and 414 in China agreed to participate and provided the necessary contacts at the SBU/division level. In the second stage, on strategic types, we contacted the designated SBU managers directly and mailed a questionnaire and personalized letter to each manager. We employed a three-wave mailing on the basis of the recommendations of Dillman (1978). We received data on the multi-item measures of the strategic types from 308 firms in the United States, 354 firms in Japan, and 352 firms in China.Two items at the end of the instrument assessed respondents confidence in their ability to answer the questions. Respondents with a low level of confidence (less than 6) were excluded from the final sample. In the third stage, on the four capabilities, we sent another(prenominal) questionnaire to the SBU managers, followed again by a three-wave mailing. This time, we received data on the rela- Data 16 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto tive capabilities from 216 U. S. firms, 248 Japanese firms, and 245 Chinese firms.These sample sizes represent response rates of 27. 0% in the United States, 31. 0% in Japan, and 30. 6% in China. The final sample includes the following industries computer-related products electronics electric equipment and household appliances pharmaceuticals, drugs, and medicines machinery telecommunications equipment instruments and related products air conditioning chemicals and related products and transportation equipment. The majority of participating SBUs/divisions had annual sales of $11 trillion$750 million and 10012,500 employees.Appendix A presents all of the measures use in this study. We asked respondents to rate their SBU on each of the capability scale items relative to their major competitors. We employ an 11-point scale to elicit levels of agreement, with values ranging from 0 (much worse than our competitor s) to 10 (much better than our competitors). We used the data collected in the second phase of the collection process to classify the SBU/division into the four strategic types. We adopted the 11-item scale from Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan (1990).We classified the SBUs strategic type (prospector, analyzer, defender, or reactor) using the majority-rule decision structure (for details, see Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajan 1990) with the following modification For an SBU to be classified as a prospector or a defender, it must have at least seven correct answers. Before testing our hypotheses, we performed principal broker analyses with Varimax rotation on all the variables measuring the four relative capabilities for all three countries. To assess measurement in form, we examined factor structure affinity (Mullen 1995).We retained variables using the following criteria (1) Each factor must contain the same scale items across all three countries, (2) each items factor loading must be comparable across all three countries, and (3) for each factor, the factor loading must overstep . 40. This procedure produced four factors and reduced the total number of variables to 21. We made comparisons among the factor structures of the three countries using visual inspection, the salient similarity index, and Pearson correlation of the factor loadings across the three countries. The factor loadings appear in set back 1.As indicated, all factors are distinguishable and well defined for all three countries. The share of the variance explained by the four factors is 72% for the United States, 71% for Japan, and 69% for China. The examination of the diagonal of the factor score covariance matrix indicates that all factors for the three Measures ANALYSIS AND RESULTS Factor Analysis of the Capability Scales Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 17 put off 1. Principal Component Factor Analysis revolved Factor Patterns United States Market-Linking Capabilit ies Market-sensing capabilities Customer-linking (i. e. creating and managing durable customer relationships) capabilities Capabilities of creating durable relationships with our suppliers Ability to retain customers Channel-bonding capabilities (creating durable relationships with channel members such as wholesalers, retailers) Eigenvalue of this factor % variance explained by this factor Technical Capabilities Manufacturing processes Technology development capabilities Ability of predicting technological changes in the industry Production facilities New product development capabilities Eigenvalue of this factor % variance explained by this factor Marketing Capabilities noesis of competitors Effectiveness of advertising programs desegregation of marketing activities Skill to segment and target markets Effectiveness of pricing programs Knowledge of customers Eigenvalue of this factor % variance explained by this factor IT Capabilities IT systems for facilitating crossfunctional in tegration IT systems for new product development projects IT systems for internal communication (e. g. , across different departments, levels of the organization) IT systems for facilitating technology knowledge creation IT systems for facilitating market knowledge creation Eigenvalue of this factor % variance explained by this factor . 71 . 80 . 90 . 58 . 86 . 85 . 62 . 89 4. 22 20. 1 . 97 . 93 . 90 . 92 . 91 6. 10 29. 1 . 85 Japan .81 China .88 .80 . 81 . 79 .77 . 71 . 57 .79 . 66 . 70 .65 3. 04 14. 4 .44 1. 68 8. 0 .67 2. 64 12. 6 .79 . 78 . 78 . 77 . 71 2. 51 12. 0 70 . 81 . 69 . 73 . 78 4. 36 20. 7 .95 . 95 . 94 . 95 . 90 . 86 5. 69 27. 1 .95 . 86 . 94 . 93 . 83 . 83 5. 39 25. 7 .90 . 89 .83 . 80 .75 . 66 . 74 1. 66 7. 9 .85 . 65 . 57 5. 08 24. 2 .46 . 67 . 63 1. 75 8. 3 18 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto countries are internally consistent and well defined by the measurement items. We provide the final set of include measurement items in Appendix A a nd the construct reliabilities (as measured by Cronbachs ? ) and item-to-total correlations in Appendix B. All 12 construct reliabilities (three countries ? four constructs) exceeded the . 70 level that Peter (1979) recommends.To test H1H4 in each of the three country settings, we performed multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) to compare the scores on each of the four multi-item relative capability scales across all four strategic types using SAS general linear model procedure. For each capability scale, we obtained a multiple-item scale by a simple average of the items. As Table 2 shows, the MANOVA F-statistic was significant for all four relative capabilities and in all three countries, so we computed matewise comparisons to examine the nature of the differences in relative capabilities among the four strategic types. We also include the t-test results of the pairwise comparisons in Table 2.The results in Table 2 provide support for H1H4 in all three countries. (A hypothes is is supported if at least one pairwise comparison is significant and the military commission is in the hypothesized direction. ) As H1 hypothesized, the relative marketlinking capabilities of defenders and analyzers are importantly greater than those of prospectors in all three countries, though the difference between defenders and analyzers is not significant. For example, in the United States, mean scores on market-linking capabilities are 2. 69, 2. 35, and 1. 67 for defenders, analyzers, and prospectors, respectively. The F-statistic from the analysis of variance is 3. 52, which is significant at p . 05.T-tests of the paired comparisons showed that both the defender mean and the analyzer mean were importantly larger than the prospector mean (D P A P) at the p . 05 level. We obtained similar results for the Japanese and Chinese samples. These findings are consistent with H1. Prospectors have lower market-linking capabilities than defenders and analyzers because the latter two strategic types rely primarily on their market-sensing and -linking abilities to serve their current markets with their current products and technologies. The results also support H2 (prospectors have greater technical capabilities than defenders) in all three countries.For the United States, the prospector and defender means were 3. 42 and 2. 25, respectively, significantly different at p . 05. Both prospectors and analyzers technical capabilities are greater than those of defenders in Japan. The means for prospector, analyzer, and defender were 8. 75, 8. 47, and 7. 84, respectively both prospector and analyzer means were significantly Tests of H1H4 Possession of Capabilities by Different Strategic Types Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 19 20 Table 2. Analysis of Variance Results congress Capabilities and Strategic Types Strategic Type Prospector 1. 67 (1. 67) 3. 42 (2. 70) 1. 75 (1. 50) 7. 5 (1. 49) 6. 72 (1. 79) 5. 48 (1. 09) 5. 05 (1. 72) 2. 37 (1. 7 5) 3. 26 (1. 99) 1. 98 (2. 38) 2. 78 (2. 46) 2. 25 (2. 59) 2. 46 (2. 90) 2. 16* 7. 47** 31. 96** 2. 35 (1. 82) 2. 69 (1. 79) 2. 46 (2. 01) 3. 52** Univariate Defender reactor F-Value Paired Comparisons Hypothesis (t-Tests)a D P A P PD D A D P D R A P P A P D P R A D A R Countries/Relative Capabilities Analyzer Supportedb Yes Yes Yes Yes United States Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities IT capabilities Japan 1. 03 (. 91) 8. 75 (1. 23) 3. 58 (2. 36) 9. 48 (. 87) 9. 00 (1. 01) 3. 9 (2. 88) 8. 47 (1. 20) 7. 84 (1. 35) 3. 68 (2. 73) 8. 72 (1. 09) 1. 96 (1. 12) 2. 07 (1. 19) 2. 51 (1. 56) 7. 42 (1. 42) 4. 82 (2. 29) 8. 46 (1. 28) 19. 17** 12. 02** 2. 24* 11. 28** D P A P R D R A R P P D P R A D A R R D R A R P P A P D P R A R Yes Yes No Yes Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto IT capabilities Strategic Type Prospector 1. 21 (1. 2 8) 8. 53 (1. 27) 2. 92 (2. 20) 8. 96 (1. 10) 8. 58 (1. 13) 7. 94 (1. 33) 7. 59 (1. 60) 13. 38** 3. 37 (2. 52) 3. 9 (2. 82) 4. 13 (2. 45) 2. 30* 7. 81 (1. 28) 7. 43 (1. 19) 6. 79 (1. 85) 15. 69** 2. 17 (1. 52) 2. 22 (1. 49) 2. 71 (1. 74) 11. 21** Univariate Defender Reactor F-Value Paired Comparisons Hypothesis (t-Tests)a D P A P R A R P P A P D P R A R D R D P R P P A P D P R A D A R Countries/Relative Capabilities Analyzer Supportedb Yes Yes Yes Yes China Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities IT capabilities Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types *p . 10. **p . 05. aSignificant differences at p . 0 are reported. bA hypothesis is supported if at least one pair is significantly different in the hypothesized direction. Notes Each cell shows the mean standard deviations are in parentheses. P = prospector, A = analyzer, D = defender, and R = reactor. Table 2. go on 21 higher than the defender mean at p . 05. In Ch ina, prospectors scored higher than analyzers and defenders on this capability (prospector, analyzer, and defender means were 8. 53, 7. 81, and 7. 43, respectively the prospector mean was significantly higher than the other two means at p . 05). H3 was supported in the United States and China samples. For the U. S. ample, defenders had significantly greater marketing capabilities than analyzers, and analyzers had significantly greater marketing capabilities than prospectors. The defender, analyzer, and prospector means on relative marketing capabilities in the United States were 3. 26, 2. 37, and 1. 75, respectively, all significantly different from one another at p . 05 according to the pairwise t-tests. For the Chinese sample, the provided differences are the pair between defenders and prospectors and the pair between reactors and prospectors. However, for the Japanese samples, the hypothesis was not supported. The three archetypal strategic types were insignificantly different and, notably, rather low.The reactors had significantly greater marketing capabilities than all other three strategic types. Finally, H4 was also supported in all three countries. Almost without exception, prospectors had greater IT capabilities than analyzers, which in relinquish had greater IT capabilities than defenders. For example, in the U. S. sample, the relative IT capabilities for prospectors, analyzers, and defenders were 7. 95, 6. 72, and 5. 48, respectively, all significantly different from one another at p . 05. Similar results were found in Japan and China. In summary, our expectations, expressed in our hypotheses, were that prospectors would be strongest in technical and IT capabilities and defenders in market-linking and marketing capabilities.We find support for all these hypotheses in all three countries, and all significant findings were in the hypothesized directions. The next set of hypotheses involves expected cross-national differences in terms of the relat ionship between capabilities and strategic types due to cultural or business environment differences. Before discussing the direct empirical testing of these hypotheses, however, we explain some preliminary findings regarding cross-national differences using data from Table 2. Market-Linking Capabilities. Reactors had significantly greater relative market-linking capabilities than did other strategic types in both Japan and China, but not in the United States. Market-linking capability = 2. 51 and 2. 71 in Japan and China, respectively in each case, this is the highest capability mean. ) Miles and Snow (1978) find that reactors Tests of H5H8 Cross-National Similarities and Differences 22 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto did not implement strategies consistently and therefore did not fully develop internal capabilities that would enable them to compete successfully. Our results suggest that this expectation is not borne out in Japan or China, possibly becaus e some firms in these countries have well-developed market-linking capabilities but choose to compete as reactors rather than defenders.That is, superior market-sensing skills enable these firms to act successfully as prospectors in certain markets and as adapters or defenders in others. This finding appears to be supported by the H3 results, at least for Japanese firms. Reactors in Japan have significantly greater relative marketing capabilities than all other strategic types. Leaders of a multinational organization doing business against a Japanese competitor should keep in mind that a firm apparently lacking a consistent strategy (i. e. , displaying reactive behavior) may be nonetheless highly skilled in marketing and market linking and, therefore, a surprisingly formidable opponent. Technical Capabilities.Although H2 was largely supported, it is worthwhile to note that across all four strategic types, managers from U. S. firms rated their technical capabilities (relative to comp etitors) substantially lower than did their Japanese or Chinese counterparts. The means for the United States were 2. 23. 4 on a ten-point scale, and comparable means in Japan and China were 79. This finding suggests that in Japan and China, all strategic types (including defenders and reactors) have well-developed relative technical capabilities. Again, a U. S. firm in competition against, for example, a Japanese defender should not infer low technical capabilities from its competitors defensive posture. Marketing Capabilities.Finally, it was surprising to note that H3, which involves relative marketing capabilities, was not supported in Japan and only partial derivatively supported in China. As we celebrated previously, Japanese reactor firms have the greatest relative marketing capabilities all other firms are insignificantly different on this capability. In China, defenders rate significantly higher than prospectors in this (as hypothesized), but we found no other significant differences among the archetypal strategic types. Cross-National Differences. To test the cross-national hypotheses (H5H8), we performed additional analyses to compare the means on each relative capability construct across countries for each of the four strategic types using SAS general linear model procedure.We used the same procedure described previously a MANOVA followed by a series of pairwise t-tests to expose significant differences. As Table 3 shows, the F-statistic was significant for 13 of the 16 possible comparisons. Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 23 Consider first the technology and IT capability hypotheses (H6 and H8). Table 3 shows that across all four strategic types, Japanese and Chinese SBUs rate significantly higher than U. S. SBUs in relative technical capabilities. As an example, technical capabilities for prospectors were rated as 8. 75, 8. 53, and 3. 42 for Japan, China, and the United States, respectively (significant at p . 05).This is directly accessary of H6. Japanese and Chinese SBUs also rated significantly higher than their U. S. counterparts in relative IT capabilities across all four strategic types therefore, we find only partial support for H8. For prospectors, IT capabilities were 9. 48, 8. 96, and 7. 95 for Japan, China, and the United States, respectively (significant at p . 05). spirited relative IT capability among Japanese SBUs was expected according to H8, but the high relative IT capability among Chinese SBUs was unanticipated and is worthy of moreover research. We found less support for the market-linking and marketing capability hypotheses (H5 and H7).Cross-national differences are not very pronounced in the case of relative marketlinking capabilities. As Table 3 shows, U. S. prospector SBUs rate significantly higher than their Japanese and Chinese counterparts, and U. S. defenders rate significantly higher than their Japanese counterparts. These findings are contradictory to the expectat ions of H5. Given the evidence of Japanese market-linking expertise, it is surprising that Japanese SBUs rate significantly higher than U. S. or Chinese competitors in market linking only in the case of reactors. In addition, H7 is only partially supported. Japanese and Chinese prospectors and analyzers rate significantly higher than their U. S. ounterparts on relative marketing capabilities. For example, in the case of prospectors, marketing capabilities are rated as 4. 58, 2. 92, and 1. 75 for Japan, China, and the United States, respectively (significant at p . 05). Although we expected high relative marketing capability for Japan, we did not expect the significantly lower marketing capabilities among U. S. SBUs. Nevertheless, consistent patterns appear with respect to the cross-national hypotheses and suggest directions for farther research. backchat AND CONCLUSION According to the Miles and Snow (1978) typology, organizations adopt certain mechanisms to respond to environment al changes.That is, they choose to be pioneers in product or market development or to protect alive positions within their niches, or they seek some kind of intermediate position between these two extremes. As a result, firms exhibit relatively consistent strategies, or patterns of product-market innovation decisions, in response to environmental shifts. Furthermore, a firm that pursues a given strategy develops certain capabilities that help it implement that strategy, thus increasing the likelihood that it will continue to use the same strategy in response to future environmental shifts. As Ham- 24 Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di BenedettoStrategic Types/ Relative Capabilities United States 1. 67 3. 42 1. 75 7. 95 9. 48 8. 96 33. 14** 3. 58 2. 92 13. 91** 8. 75 8. 53 202. 00** 1. 03 1. 21 4. 74** Country Japan China Univariate F-Value Cross-Country Comparisonsa U. S. China U. S. Japan Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan China Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan Chi na Japan U. S. China U. S. Prospectors Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities IT capabilities Analyzers 2. 35 2. 78 2. 37 6. 72 9. 00 8. 58 3. 59 3. 37 8. 47 7. 81 230. 38** 5. 46** 58. 07** 1. 96 2. 17 1. 16n. s. Japan China Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan China Japan U. S. China U. S. Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities IT capabilities Defenders 2. 69 2. 25 3. 26 5. 48 8. 72 3. 68 3. 69 7. 94 7. 84 7. 43 2. 07 2. 22 2. 70* 163. 99** . 54n. s. 121. 94** U. S. Japan Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan China Japan U. S. China U. S. Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types IT capabilities Table 3. Analysis of Variance Results Cross-National Comparisons 25 26 Table 3.Continued Country United States 2. 46 2. 46 1. 98 5. 05 8. 46 7. 59 4. 81 4. 13 7. 42 6. 79 2. 51 2. 71 . 17n. s. 38. 68** 7. 99** 28. 82** Strategic Types/ Relative Capabilities Japan China Univariate F-Value Cross-Country Comparisonsa Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan U. S. China U. S. Japan China Japan U. S. China U. S. Reactors Market-linking capabilities Technical capabilities Marketing capabilities IT capabilities Michael Song, Robert W. Nason, and C. Anthony Di Benedetto *p . 10. **p . 05. aSignificant differences at p . 10 are reported. Notes n. s. = not significant. brick (1983, p. ) notes, prospectors tend to destiny to continue prospecting defenders tend to want to continue defending. Among the capabilities Miles and Snow investigate are technology, structure, management processes, and power distribution. As we noted previously, the Miles and Snow (1978) typology is, above all, a typology of innovation strategies. In this study, we mapped four capabilities of interest to innovating firms (market-linking, technical, marketing, and IT capabilities) onto the Miles and Snow strategic typologies. We hypothesized (in H1H4) that prospectors, which typically pursue a first-mover strategy through product-market innovation, would need to build up technical and IT capabilities.Similarly, defenders, which are most concerned with preserving protected market segments with existing technology, must develop market-linking and marketing capabilities. We found supporting evidence for all these hypotheses in firms from all three countries. We then developed and tested a set of cross-national hypotheses (H5H8), based on cultural and business environment differences existing among the United States, Japan, and China. Our development and empirical testing of these hypotheses represent a significant advance of the literature beyond the contributions of DeSarbo and colleagues (2005, 2006). We found clear support for one of the four hypotheses (H6), partial support for two others (H7 and H8), and no support for the run low (H5).In general, the cultural and business environment prev alent in Japan and China has given SBUs in those countries relative advantages in technology and IT capabilities (H6 and H8), yet we did not observe anticipated advantages in market-linking and marketing capabilities (H5 and H7). This study has some implications for theory development and further research. In general, the results support the hypotheses that relative to other organizations, prospectors develop greater technical and IT capabilities so that they can pursue first-to-market initiatives and that defenders develop greater market-linking and marketing capabilities so that they can respond effectively to marketplace changes.These findings lend support to the Miles and Snow (1978) typology and to the contention that organizations tend to respond in certain, consistent ways to environmental change. Therefore, our findings can be interpreted as further empirical support of the Miles and Snow typology, originally conceived after an exploratory study of a limited number of indust ries but empirically supported in other settings (Hambrick 2003). Our findings are also consistent with Hambricks (1983) contention that prospectors want to keep prospecting and consequently develop the capabilities most closely related to Information Technology Capabilities and Strategic Types 27 prospecting more than do other firms. Because IT has evolved only in the past few years, further research should explore the concussion of IT on strategic choices.Because no existing theories are sufficient to enable us to predict a priori the nature of cross-national differences in the relationship between the four capabilities and strategic types, further research also should examine further our preliminary results regarding cross-national differences in relative capabilities. In addition, note that our model provides evidence of the validity of Conant, Mokwa, and Varadarajans (1990) 11-item scale for assessing strategic type in both Japan and China. We believe that this is the first ap plication of this scale in China and one of the first in Japan (for an earlier Japanese application, see Dyer and Song 1997). There are several notable managerial implications. The Miles and Snow (1978) typology suggests that organizations must do a sincere internal and external assessment when planning strategic moves for future competition.The external assessment should include analysis not only of likely opportunities or developments in product, market, and technology but also of past moves by primary competitors classified by strategic type. In the internal assessment, the organizations leaders must identify honestly the firms strengths and recognize its weaknesses in light of external challenges. They must then choose a strategic stance, deciding how it can best capitalize on the strengths and overcome the weaknesses. Although this recommendation is hardly new, it is important in this context to recognize that there is a mutually antonymous relationship between capabilities an d strategies.Relative strengths in technology and IT capabilities might suggest that a prospector (or even an analyzer) strategy could be a more appropriate choice than a defender strategy. Consistent, successful pursuit of a prospector strategy over time should help a firm develop these relative strengths and enable it to retain its competitive advantage. This implicitly suggests also that a firm that recognizes itself as a reactor type should use its internal assessment to square off which archetypal strategic type it should strive to become. Cross-national differences in strategic type also carry managerial implications. Previously, we noted several